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Un modelo de decisión para un agricultor que es averso al riesgo en el sentido 
Arrow-Pratt y averso al riesgo downside
RESUMEN: Este estudio proporciona un marco de decisión para analizar las decisiones óptimas de diver-
sificación productiva en condiciones de incertidumbre para un agricultor que es averso al riesgo en el sen-
tido Arrow-Pratt y averso al riesgo downside. El modelo de decisión incorpora el tercer momento central de 
la distribución conjunta de los retornos del porfolio. Esto es especialmente relevante para distribuciones de 
retornos asimétricos. Este modelo incluye el modelo de decisión clásica como un caso especial. El beneficio 
de la generalización es que permite discernir cada hipótesis de comportamiento econométricamente a través 
de la estimación del coeficiente de aversión al riesgo y al downside.
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preferencia por skewness.
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1. Introduction
Risk is present in all agricultural management decisions, as a result of price, 
yield and resource uncertainty. Furthermore, the attitudes of producers toward risk 
inﬂuence acreage. Empirical results show that agricultural producers are risk averse 
(Just, 1974, 1975, 2003; Antle, 1987, 1989, 2010; Pope and Just, 1991; Gómez-
Limón et al., 2003; Picazo-Tadeo and Wall, 2011). Additionally, risk aversion has 
been found to influence farmer’s technology adoption (Marra et al., 2003). 
Extending the estimation of risk aversion coefficients to include downside risk 
aversion, Antle (1987, 1989) finds empirical support that farmers are risk averse in 
the Arrow-Pratt sense and downside risk averse. More recently, Di Falco and Chavas 
(2006, 2009), Hennessy (2009) and Antle (2010) incorporate downside risk aversion 
on input use decisions, showing the importance of input’s asymmetric effects on output 
distributions on the optimal input use decision. Many other authors present evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that agents prefer a distribution that is more right skewed 
(Tronstad and McNeill, 1989; Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2006; Yang et al., 2010).
In light of the empirical evidence which shows that agricultural production does 
not follow a normal distribution or, for that matter, a symmetric probability distribu-
tion (e.g., Day, 1965; Gallagher, 1987; and Just and Weninger, 1999) it is restrictive 
to model farmer’s decision under risk using the expected value-variance (E-V) deci-
sion rule (Grootveld and Hallerbach, 1999; Bouyssou et al., 2000; and Ehrgott et al., 
2004). Restrictive assumptions must be made about the probability distribution (e.g., 
normally distributed random variables) and about the agent’s utility function (e.g., 
quadratic utility functions) to ensure consistency of the optimal choices between ex-
pected utility maximization and E-V analysis. 
This suggests that in order to explicitly account for the farmer’s preference 
for right skewed distributions (downside risk aversion) when using a moment-
based approximation of the agent’s von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function, it 
is necessary to employ a third-order moment-based Taylor’s series expansion of 
the farmer’s expected utility function. Hence, it is necessary to select the optimal 
production portfolio on the basis of the first three moments of the probability distri-
bution, rather than on the first two. Menezes and Wang (2004, 2005) and Eeckhoudt 
and Schlesinger (2006) provide a general choice theoretic characterization of the 
decision of an investor with preferences for skewness. More recently, Garlappi and 
Skoulakis (2011) provide conditions under which the approximate expected utility 
of a given portfolio based on a third order Taylor Series Expansion converges to its 
exact counterpart. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a decision framework to analyze produc-
tion diversification decisions under uncertainty for a farmer who is risk averse in the 
Arrow-Pratt sense and downside risk averse, which explicitly allows for the analysis 
of the trade-off between expected returns, variance and skewness. A higher moment-
based approximation than a third order Taylor’s series approximation will not be 
employed since as Brockett and Kahane (1992) show, in empirical studies the fourth 
moment showed significance only in a few cases, and higher moments were always 
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insignificant. This general model (E-V-S) contains the classical E-V portfolio model 
as a special case. The contribution of this generalization is that estimation of the 
structural econometric model allows each competing behavioral hypothesis to be dis-
cerned econometrically through the significance of the agent’s coefficient of absolute 
and relative downside risk aversion. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section develops a moment-based 
approximation of the farmer´s expected utility function. The producer´s decision 
model which explicitly allows for the analysis of the trade-off between expected 
returns, variance and skewness, is presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the prop-
erties of the farmer´s optimal acreage allocation functions. The proposed structural 
econometric model is derived in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. A moment-based approximation of the farmer’s expected utility function
In what follows, we develop a parametric optimization model for investment deci-
sions under uncertainty for a farmer who is risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense and 
downside risk averse explicitly accounting for the third central moment of the joint 
distribution of the portfolio’s returns. 
The producer’s expected utility of wealth is modeled as
[1]
where W
0
 denotes initial wealth, a = [a1, a2, ..., am]´ is a vector of non-negative 
acreage allocations to different outputs which satisfy the adding up constraint 
l´ a ≤ A where A is the total available acreage, and [ ]'1 ~,...,~~ mπππ = is a vector of sto-
chastic output returns. Taking a third order Taylor’s series expansion of ( )πα ~'0 +WU  
about expected final wealth, 
1µ+= oWW , yields
[2]
where m
1 
is the output portfolio’s expected profits, m
k
 represents the k
th
 central mo-
ment of the portfolio’s returns, , ( )WRa  and ( )WDa  denote the agent’s Arrow-
Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion and coefficient of absolute downside risk 
aversion, respectively, and ( )321 ,,,, µµµαoWV  is the agent’s expected utility func-
tion. The expected returns of the output portfolio and the k
th
 central moment of the 
portfolio’s returns,  are given by
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[2a]
[2b]
[2c]
Thus, m
1
, the conditional first raw moment of the portfolio, is the weighted sum 
of expected profits of each output, m
1i
, where the weights are given by the acreage 
allocated to each output (a
i
).
Equation [2b] shows that the conditional second central moment of the output 
portfolio’s profits is composed of the weighted sum of individual output return 
variances and covariances between output profits. In general, the farmer is capable 
of reducing the output portfolio’s conditional variance by diversifying the assets in-
cluded in the portfolio. In the special case where all the covariances are negative, it 
is possible to eliminate the total conditional variance (i.e., m
2 
= 0). However, not all 
of the output portfolio’s variance can be eliminated through diversification since, in 
general, some of the covariances between outputs are positive. Even though not all of 
the portfolio’s variance is completely diversifiable, the overall conditional portfolio 
variance may be lower than the variance of any of the single outputs (Farrar, 1962; 
Elton and Gruber, 1987). 
The conditional third central moment, m
3
, or measure of skewness of the output 
portfolio consists of the weighted sum of the third central moment of each output’s 
returns and of the joint movement of the deviations of returns of outputs i, j, and k. 
The coskewness between returns of asset i, j, and k, s
i,j,k
 (.), represents the conditional 
expectation of the joint movement of the deviations of profits of outputs i, j, and k. 
The coskewness is positive whenever the returns of the three outputs move together; 
i.e., when the (un)favorable profits for all three outputs occur together. In contrast, 
s
i,j,k
 (.) is negative whenever the profits of one output are inversely related with the 
outcomes of the other two outputs. 
As with the variance of the output portfolio, [2c] implies that the amount of skew-
ness that is diversifiable depends on the coskewness of all the outputs included in the 
portfolio. Beedles and Simkowitz (1978) explain the observed investor´s choice of 
less than well-diversified portfolios by the fact that increased diversification leads to 
a progressive loss in right skewness of the portfolio, a positive attribute for downside 
risk averse investors. Right skewness of the portfolio tends to occur when the con-
ditional third central moment of returns are positive and with positive coskewness 
between asset returns.
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The farmer´s expected utility is non-decreasing in a variance and skewness pre-
serving increase in the portfolio’s expected value; that is Vm1 ≥ 0. Additionally, the 
expected utility of a risk averse and downside risk farmer is non-increasing and non-
decreasing in a mean and skewness preserving increase in portfolio’s variance and in 
a mean and variance preserving increase in portfolio’s skewness, respectively. There-
fore, when the farmer is risk averse and downside risk averse then Vm2 < 0 and Vm3 > 0.
Additionally, when the farmer is risk averse, his expected utility function is con-
cave in the portfolio’s expected value; i.e. . Expected utility increases at a 
decreasing rate as the expected value of the portfolio increases. The cross deriva-
tive of expected utility with respect to the portfolio’s expected value and variance 
 is ambiguous and depends on the effect of the farmer´s wealth on the 
coefficients of risk aversion and downside risk aversion. Under DARA, CARA, and 
IARA1, an increase in portfolio’s variance increases, does not affect, and decreases 
the marginal effect of the expected value of the portfolio’s returns on expected 
utility. This is evidenced by differentiating [2] with respect to m
1
 and m
2
 which 
yields  which will be positive, zero, and negative whenever the 
farmer´s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing, constant, or increasing 
in the level of wealth. Similarly,  will be positive, zero, and negative 
whenever the agent’s coefficient of absolute downside risk aversion is increasing, 
constant, or decreasing in the level of wealth (IDRA, CADRA, and DDRA). This 
result is derived by differentiating [2] with respect to m
1
 and then with respect to m
3
, 
which yields .
Let  and  denote the slopes of the farmer´s indifference 
curves between and m
1
 and m
2
 between m
1
 and m
3
, respectively. These indifference 
curves are upward sloping and downward sloping, respectively, under risk aversion 
and downside risk aversion; i.e.,  and  since 0
1
≥µV , 02 <µV  and . 
The marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 ( ), for a given level of 
m
3
, represents the increase in m
1
 which is necessary to maintain the farmer´s expected 
utility level invariant for a given increase in m
2
 (i.e., ). 
On the other hand, the marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
3
 ( ), 
for a given level of m
2
, represents the decrease in m
1
 which is necessary to main-
tain the farmer´s expected utility level invariant for a given increase in m
3
 (i.e., 
).
Results (I.1) - (I.6), proven in Propositions A.1 and A.2 of the annex, summarize 
the properties of these indifference curves.
(I.1) ,
(I.2) ,
(I.3)  under IARA,CARA, DARA,
(I.4)  under IARA,CARA, DARA.
(I.5)  under IADRA,CADRA, DADRA
(I.6)  under IADRA,CADRA, DADRA
1 DARA is decreasing absolute risk aversion, CARA is constant absolute risk aversion, and IARA is 
increasing absolute risk aversion.
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Results (I.1) and (I.2) state that the slopes of the indifference curves between 
m
1
 and m
2
 and between m
1
 and m
3
 become steeper under a variance and skewness 
preserving increase in the first raw moment of the portfolio’s returns; that is, as 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show, as m
1
 increases, ceteris paribus, the marginal rates of 
substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 and between m
1
 and m
3
 increase.
FIGURE 1
Effect of an increase in 
1
 on the slopes of the agent’s indifference curves 
between 
1
 and 
2
 and between 
1
 and 
3
Source: Own elaboration.
The effect of an increase in the conditional second central moment of out-
put returns however, is not so clear. Results (I.3) and (I.4) state that when the 
farmer´s Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing, constant, or 
increasing in wealth, the slope of the indifference curve between m
1
 and m
2
 decreases, 
remains constant, or increases and the slope of the indifference curve between m
1
 and 
m
3
 increases, remains unchanged, or decreases as m
2
 increases. Figure 2 presents the 
case of decreasing absolute risk aversion. As the conditional second central moment 
increases, ceteris paribus, the agent moves to a new indifference curve between 
m
1
 and m2, V 1, where the marginal rate of substitution between these two moments 
is lower (Figure 2(a)). On the other hand, the increase in m
2
 produces a rotation of 
the indifference curve between m
1
 and m
3
, on the initial point ( ), such that the 
marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
3
 decreases (Figure 2(b)); the initial 
indifference curve rotates from V 0 to V 1 which has a lower slope at ( ).
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FIGURE 2
Effect of an increase in 
2
 on the slopes of the agent’s indifference curves 
between 
1
 and 
2
 and between 
1
 and 
3
 under DARA
Source: Own elaboration.
The effects of an increase in the conditional third central moment on the agent’s 
marginal rates of substitution between the moments of the distribution of the port-
folio’s returns depend on the rate of change of the coefficient of absolute downside 
risk aversion. From (I.5) and (I.6), under increasing, constant, or decreasing ab-
solute downside risk aversion, the marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 
and between m
1
 and m
3
 decreases, does not change, or increases as m
3
 increases. The 
case of decreasing downside risk aversion is depicted in Figure 3. As Figure 3(a) 
shows, an increase in the conditional third central moment produces a rotation of 
the indifference curve between m
1
 and m
2
 such that the marginal rate of substitution 
between these moments increases. Further, the increase in m
3
 leads to an increase in 
the marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
3 
as the agent shifts to a higher in-
difference curve, see Figure 3(b).
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FIGURE 3 
Effect of an increase in 3 on the slopes of the agent’s indifference curves 
between 
1
 and 2 and between 1 and 3 under DADRA
Source: Own elaboration.
3. Selection of the optimal portfolio of assets
The farmer selects the optimal output portfolio by determining the acreage alloca-
tion of each output, a*, so as to
[3]
where l is an (m*1) unit vector, defined by [3a], represents the expected returns, 
and m2 and m3 denote the second and third central moments, given by equations [3b] 
and [3c], respectively. The necessary Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions (FOC) 
which characterize the optimal acreage allocations, for i = 1,...,m are:
A decision framework for a farmer who is risk averse... 13
[3a]
[3b]
[3c]
where  .
The first term of the right hand side of equations [3a] and [3b] represents the 
effects of the choice variables on the conditional first raw moment of total portfolio 
profits. The second and third terms, on the other hand, represent the impact of the 
choice variables on the conditional second and third central moments of random 
profits, respectively. In the special case of CARA and when the agent is not down-
side risk averse, equations [3a] - [3c] reduce to the usual Kuhn-Tucker first order 
conditions associated with the expected-variance approach2.
Equations [3a] - [3c] characterize the optimal acreage allocations for i = 1,...,m. 
Equation [3a] implies that output i will be included in the portfolio (i.e., ) if 
and only if its marginal expected utility evaluated at  is greater than .3 The 
tendency of an output to be included in the optimal portfolio is affected by several 
factors. First, output i tends to be in the optimal output mix whenever the marginal 
contribution of output i to the overall expected net return of the portfolio is more 
positive (i.e., ). Second, it tends to be included if the marginal contribution 
of output i to the conditional second central moment of the portfolio of outputs, 
evaluated at a
i 
= 0, is non-positive. Third, output i is included in the optimal portfolio 
mix whenever its marginal contribution to the third central moment of the portfolio 
of outputs, evaluated at a
i 
= 0 is non-negative.
Additionally, the coefficients of absolute risk aversion and of absolute downside 
risk aversion are positively related to the benefits of diversification; the higher these 
coefficients are, the greater is the importance of the marginal contribution of output i 
to the portfolio’s conditional second and third central moments. For the extreme case 
where the farmer is risk neutral (i.e. S
12 
= 0 and S
13 
= 0), he chooses only one asset. 
Finally, the farmer’s initial wealth level affects the decision of whether to include an 
output in the optimal portfolio through its effect on the farmer´s coefficients of abso-
lute risk aversion and absolute downside risk aversion.
2 Note that S
12 
= 0.5R
a
 under CARA and S
13 
= 0 under downside risk neutrality.
3 The marginal expected utility of output i, , is decreasing in α
i 
since second order conditions 
imply .
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Suppose that  is satisfied for i = 1,...,t, then the necessary Kuhn-Tucker 
first order conditions can be rewritten as
[4a]
[4b]
[4c]
Under the assumptions that the land constraint is binding, the sufficient second or-
der conditions for a maximum of (3) over a
i
 i ≤ τ, is that the ((t+1) x (t+1)) bordered 
Hessian matrix of second order derivatives, ,
[5]
is negative definite, where L(a*,l*) denotes the Lagrangian function evaluated at 
the optimal values of the choice variables4.
4. Properties of optimal output acreage allocations
In principle, by the implicit function theorem, one can solve [4a] - [4c] for the 
optimal acreage allocations and the optimal shadow value of the land constraint, 
, as functions of the parameters of the decision model5. Substituting 
these into [4a] - [4c] and differentiating with respect to a parameter of the model 
yields the fundamental equation of comparative statics
4 The second order conditions for all those assets not included in the optimal portfolio are automatically 
satisfied.
5 The implicit function theorem states that first order conditions can be solved for the optimal asset 
allocations as functions of the parameters of the problem, if the Bordered Hessian matrix of second order 
conditions is negative definite. 
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[6]
where  
 and  denote vectors of distinct covariances 
and coskewness coefficients, respectively,  is the negative definite bordered Hes-
sian matrix of second order conditions6. Isolating  from [6] yields
[7]
where  represents the negative-definite bordered Hessian matrix of second order 
conditions and 
ki
 denotes the kith cofactor of .
For the case where the conditional first raw moment of the returns of output i 
changes (i.e. ), [7] becomes
[8]
Note, additionally, that the effect of a change in the farmer’s final expected 
wealth on the optimal acreage allocated to output i is
[9]
Equation [9] implies that the net effect on the optimal acreage allocations of a 
change in the first raw moment of returns of output i is given by
[10]
6 In the derivation of the fundamental equation of comparative statics, the marginal change in the exo-
genous variable is implicitly assumed not to induce a discrete change in the optimal asset allocations; that 
is, the marginal change does not induce the investor to cease investment of an asset or to include an asset 
that was not originally included in the optimal asset mix.
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where  denotes the increase in the wealth compensated output 
allocation due to an increase in its own first raw moment of returns7. Hence, the net 
change in the optimal acreage allocation of output i due to an increase in its own first 
raw moment of returns is not unambiguous and depends on the effects of an increase 
in the final expected level of wealth. 
The effect of m
1i
 is unambiguously positive on  when the farmer is risk averse 
and downside risk averse, since an increase in the agent’s initial expected wealth 
leads to an unambiguous increase in the use of an input which decreases the condi-
tional variance and increases the conditional third central moment of per acre profits. 
This result is derived from [9] and the fact that under risk aversion and downside risk 
aversion, the agent’s preferences are convex and, thus,  and  . Hence, 
this effect is due to the increase in the marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 
and between m
1
 and m
3
. This result is unambiguous in the sense that it is independent 
of the rate of change of the agent’s coefficients of absolute risk aversion and absolute 
downside risk aversion.
Additionally, the effect of m
1i
 is unambiguously positive on  when: (i) the 
farmer is risk neutral, since  under risk neutrality, and (ii) under CARA 
and CADRA, since  under CARA and  under CADRA. In 
the special case of CARA and when the farmer is not downside risk averse, equation 
[10] reduces to
[11]
which is the standard result associated with the expected-variance approach.
Proposition 1 summarizes the effects of a conditional mean and conditional third 
central moment preserving increase in the conditional variance of portfolio´s returns 
(m
2
) and of a conditional mean and conditional variance preserving increase in the 
conditional third central moment (m
3
) on optimal acreage allocation in output i for a 
risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense and downside risk averse investor.
Proposition 1 For a risk averse and downside risk averse farmer, if an output 
decreases the variance and increases the third central moment of the portfolio’s 
returns then
 (a)  under IARA and CARA,
 (b)  under IADRA and CADRA.
Result (a) of Proposition 1 establishes that the effect of a conditional mean and 
conditional third central moment preserving increase in the conditional variance of 
7 When  is negative-definite, then  and  (Takayama, 1985, pg: 162-163).
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portfolio’s returns is ambiguous; it can be signed however, under certain assump-
tions on the rate of change of the agent’s risk attitudes. The direct effect of an in-
crease in m
2
 is to increase the importance of the marginal reduction in the conditional 
variance caused by including output i (a
1
) in the optimal portfolio, thus encouraging 
an increased acreage allocation in output i. Under increasing or constant absolute 
risk aversion, the indirect effect is also non-negative; an increase in m
2
 increases the 
marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 (Property I.3) thus increasing the 
importance of the risk reducing properties of a
i
. Under DARA, on the other hand, an 
increase in m
2
 reduces the marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 implying 
that it is optimal to reduce a
i
, while the direct effect leads to an increase in the opti-
mal input use; hence, the final effect is ambiguous.
The effect of a conditional mean and conditional variance preserving increase in 
the conditional third central moment, as result (b) shows, is also ambiguous8. The im-
portance of the positive marginal effect of a
i
 on the conditional third central moment 
decreases as the conditional third central moment of per acre profits increases; this di-
rect effect implies that a decrease in a
i
 is optimal. The indirect effect of the reduction 
in downside risk, on the other hand, depends on the rate of change of the agent’s coef-
ficient of absolute downside risk aversion. When the coefficient of absolute downside 
risk aversion is increasing or constant in wealth, the indirect effect of an increase in 
m
3
 is a decrease in the marginal rate of substitution between m
1
 and m
2
 and between m
1
 
and m
3
, leading to a decreased use of the input (Properties I.5 and I.6). Hence, under 
IADRA or CADRA, the indirect effect reinforces the direct effect and the optimal use 
of a
i
 will decrease. Under DADRA, on the other hand, the indirect effect opposes the 
direct effect of a decrease in downside risk so the final effect is ambiguous.
5. The empirical model
The econometric specification of the model is derived by employing a first-order 
Taylor’s series approximation of the optimal acreage and of the conditional first raw 
moment and conditional second and third central moments of per acre revenues, for 
all farmers and time periods, which yields
[12a]
8 A conditional mean and variance preserving increase in the conditional skewness leads to a distribu-
tion of per acre profits which has less downside risk.
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[12b]
[12c]
[12d]
[12e]
[12f]
Equations [12b] - [12f] determine the moments of the joint distribution of per 
acre profits.
The estimation of m equations established in [12a] is feasible when data is available 
on acreage allocations. However, there are drawbacks to estimating [12a] - [12f] even 
when the necessary data is available. No structure of the decision process has been 
imposed on the acreage allocation equations. This is a serious drawback since the lack 
of structure in the estimation leads to a loss of efficiency of the econometric estimates 
(Just et al., 1983). Moreover, direct estimation of [12a] does not ensure that the esti-
mated acreage allocations are mutually consistent with the farmer’s underlying deci-
sion problem. The necessary structure can be imposed by estimating equations [12a] 
- [12f] jointly with the producer’s first order conditions. This approach imposes on the 
optimal acreage allocations the theoretical restrictions and properties implied by the 
decision model. Additionally, this approach is a source of additional non-redundant 
information that helps identify the structural parameters. Specifically, [12a] - [12f] can 
be jointly estimated with the following 2m + 1 equations
[13a]
[13b]
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[13c]
In order to estimate the 2m+1 equations included in equations [12] and [13], data 
on a, w, x, and l are necessary. In general, however, the shadow value of land is not 
observable. In order to overcome this empirical obstacle, the land constraint can be 
substituted into the producer’s decision problem by solving for a
mft
. This procedure 
yields the following set of FOC to be estimated jointly with equations [12].
[14a]
[14b]
[14c]
[14d]
These equations depend on the farmer’s coefficients of absolute risk aversion and 
absolute downside risk aversion which are functions of the expected end of period 
wealth. The farmer’s Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is defined as
[15]
where  . This specification is flexible enough to permit risk-
loving, risk-neutral, and risk-averse behavior (Bar-Shira et al., 1997);
[15a]
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Furthermore, the rate of change of the producer’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion can be tested with the above functional specification of ; the sign of 
the elasticity of absolute risk aversion with respect to wealth, h
2
, determines whether 
the agent’s degree of risk aversion decreases, remains unchanged, or increases as the 
level of wealth increases. For a risk averse farmer (h
2 
> 0), for example,
[15b]
The agent’s coefficient of absolute downside risk aversion can be specified as
[16]
The rates of change of these coefficients of absolute downside risk aversion are
[16a]
Hence, the signs of h
1
 and h
2 
also determine whether the producer is downside 
risk averse and the rate of change of the coefficients of absolute and relative down-
side risk aversion. Table 1 presents all plausible signs of h
1
 and h
2 
and their impli-
cations for the agent’s risk attitudes. For example, if h
1 
> 0 and -1 < h
2
< 0 then the 
farmer is risk averse in the Arrow-Pratt sense and downside risk averse and their 
coefficients of absolute (relative) risk aversion and downside risk aversion are de-
creasing (increasing) in . In some cases a qualitative analysis of the signs of h
1
 and 
h
2
 is not sufficient to determine the characteristics of the producer’s downside risk 
attitudes; in these cases it is necessary to analyze the relative magnitude of each term 
of [16a]. 
Finally, estimation of the structural econometric model allows us to test whether 
producers are risk averse and/or downside risk averse through the significance of the 
agent’s coefficient of absolute and relative downside risk aversion. 
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TABLE 1
Implications of the signs of parameters of the agent’s coefficients of risk 
aversion and downside risk aversion
h
1
h
1
R
a
( ) R´
a
( ) R´
r
( ) D
a
( ) D´
a
( ) D´
r
( )
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
> 1 - - - + + +
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
= 1 - - - + + +
h
1 
< 0 0 < h
2 
< 1 - - - + ? +
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
= 0 - 0 - + 0 +
h
1 
< 0 -1 < h
2 
< 0 - + - ? - ?
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
= -1 - + 0 ? ? 0
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
< -1 - + + ? ? ?
h
1 
< 0 -∞ < h
2
 < ∞ 0 n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a.
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
> 1 + + + ? ? ?
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
= 1 + + + ? + ?
h
1 
< 0 0 < h
2
 < 1 + + + ? + +
h
1 
< 0 h
2 
= 0 + 0 + + 0 +
h
1 
= 0 -1 < h
2
 < 0 + - + + - +
h
1 
> 0 h
2 
= 1 + - 0 + - 0
h
1 
> 0 h
2 
< -1 + - - + - -
n.a. = Not applicable.
Source: Own elaboration.
6. Conclusions
This study provides a general framework to analyze the trade-off between ex-
pected returns, variance and skewness for a farmer who is risk averse in the Arrow-
Pratt sense and downside risk averse. The decision model for a risk averse and down-
side risk averse farmer developed in this paper explicitly accounts for the conditional 
third central moment of the joint distribution of outputs. This general model contains 
the classical E-V portfolio model as a special case. The benefit of this generaliza-
tion is that estimation of the structural econometric model allows each competing 
behavioral hypothesis to be discerned econometrically through the significance of the 
agent’s coefficient of absolute and relative downside risk aversion. 
Endogeneity of the optimal output mix is also explicitly considered. The model 
establishes that an output tends to be included in the optimal portfolio whenever its 
marginal contribution to the overall expected value and third central moment is posi-
tive and when its marginal contribution to the overall second central moment is nega-
tive. Additionally, the output choice decision depends on the investor’s coefficients 
of risk and downside risk aversion. 
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Given the decision framework, the farmer´s optimal portfolio choice depends 
on the farmer´s initial wealth and the moments of the joint distribution of portfolio 
returns. The results show that an output i tends to be included in the optimal port-
folio whenever its marginal contribution to the overall conditional expected return 
and conditional third central moment (conditional second central moment) of the 
portfolio of assets is more positive (negative). Furthermore, the results indicate that 
a higher acreage will be allocated to an output whose expected returns are increasing 
as long as final expected wealth has a non-negative effect on optimal acreage alloca-
tions. In general, however, the effect of an exogenous variable on the optimal acreage 
allocations is ambiguous. More importantly, many of these ambiguities, which are 
important in policy analysis, can be resolved only empirically.
An interesting area of further research is the application of the decision model to 
the analysis of the firm’s risk management decisions. One of the elements of this de-
cision is whether to hedge in the futures and/or options markets which have different 
downside risk implications; futures markets increase the downside risk protection 
while options markets additionally provide a higher potential for upside gain than 
futures markets. Thus, it is necessary to include downside risk in the optimal risk 
management decisions of the firm.
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Annex
Proposition A.1:
Proof: Under risk aversion and downside risk aversion, the agent’s preferences 
are convex; that is,  is a convex set which implies that 
. Totally differentiating S
12
 with respect to m
2
 yields
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[A.1]
where
[A.2]
[A.3]
[A.4]
Equation [A.2] implies that  for the cases of IARA and CARA since 
Vm1 ≥ 0, Vm2 ≤ 0, and Vm1m1 ≤ 0 respectively, and Vm1m2 < (=) 0 under IARA and CARA. 
Under DARA, on the other hand, Vm1m2 > 0 so, apparently, the sign is ambiguous. It 
can, however, be unambiguously signed by employing the fact that preferences are 
convex since A.1 implies that
[A.5]
therefore, under DARA  . 
 Equation [A.4] implies that  >,=,< 0 which will occur 
under DARA, CARA, IARA. The last result is obtained by differentiating S
12
 with 
respect to m
3
 which yields
[A.6]
Expression [A.6] will be less than, equal to, and greater than zero as Vm1m3 >, =, < 0 
i.e.,  under IDRA, CDRA, DDRA.
Proposition A.2: , and  under .
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Proof: Convexity of the agent’s preferences implies
[A.7]
where
[A.8]
[A.9]
and
[A.10]
[A.8] implies that  under IDRA and CDRA since Vm1m2 < (=) 0. Further-
more, note that convexity of preferences also implies that 
[A.11]
and, thus,  under DDRA since Vm1m3 < 0.
 From [A.10] it is clear that  as Vm1m3 >, =, < 0 which is the 
case when the agent’s coefficient of absolute downside risk aversion is increasing, 
constant, decreasing in the level of wealth. Finally, differentiating S
13
 with respect to 
m
2
 yields
[A.12]
which will be <, =, > 0 under IARA, CARA, DARA.
